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Trial Practice and Procedure
by Kate S. Cook*
Alan J. Hamilton"
Brandon L. Peak***
and John C. Morrison III....
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Georgia Appellate Courts continue to consider and clarify the
impact of the Tort Reform Act of 2005' on trial practice and procedure
while addressing other legislation and case law similarly imperative to
litigation in Georgia courts. Although the Georgia General Assembly
enacted less legislation related to trial practice and procedure during
this survey period than in recent years, the few laws passed are
noteworthy.

* Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, Columbus and Atlanta, Georgia.
University of the South (B.A., magna cum laude, 1998); Mercer University, Walter F.
George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2002). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, Columbus and Atlanta, Georgia.
Auburn University (B.S.B.A., 2001); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., magna cum
laude, 2004). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. The Citadel (B.S., summa cum laude, 2001); Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2004). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. Mercer University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2003); Mercer University, Walter F.
George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2006). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 2005 Ga. Laws 1, 1-2.
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LEGISLATION

A. ProfessionalMalpracticeActions and Expert Affidavit Requirements
Effective July 1, 2007, Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")
section 9_11_9.12 has been amended in two significant aspects.3 First,
subsection (a)(2) has been expanded to require the filing of an expert
affidavit contemporaneously with any action that alleges a partnership,
corporation, trust, company, association, or other legal entity is liable for
the action or inaction of a professional, as defined under subsection (g).4
Second, a safe harbor provision has been reestablished allowing for the
late filing of an expert affidavit up to forty-five days past the date of the
filing of the complaint.5 This safe harbor provision operates under the
following circumstances: (1) when the statute of limitations will run or
is reasonably expected to run within ten days of filing the complaint; (2)
when the complaint alleges that an expert affidavit could not be timely
secured prior to filing; and (3) when the plaintiff's attorney contemporaneously files an affidavit attesting that he or she was not retained more
than ninety days before the expiration of the limitations period.' If a
complaint alleging professional malpractice is filed without an attached
expert affidavit, the deadline to file an answer and commence discovery
is thirty days after the expert affidavit is filed.7
B.

The Asbestos Act

On November 20, 2006, the Georgia Supreme Court in Daimler8
held the Asbestos Act 9 unconstitutional on
Chrysler Corp. v. Ferrante
the ground that the Act contained an inseverable and unconstitutional
requirement that its provisions be applied retroactively.1" In response,
the Georgia General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 182," which took
effect May 1, 2007, to strike the former Asbestos Act and insert a new,

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
S.E.2d
10.
11.

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (Supp. 2007).
See id.
Id. § 9-11-9.1(a)(2), (g).
See id. § 9-11-9.1(b).
Id.
Id. § 9-11-9.1(d).
281 Ga. 273, 637 S.E.2d 659 (2006).
O.C.G.A. §§ 51-14-1 to -10 (Supp. 2006), invalidated by Ferrante,281 Ga. 273, 637
659.
Ferrante, 281 Ga. at 273-75, 637 S.E.2d at 661-62.
Ga. S. Bill 182, Reg. Sess. (2007).
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perhaps more successful, Asbestos Act.' 2 Similar to the previous
Asbestos Act, the most recent incarnation of the Asbestos Act requires
physical impairment as an essential element of an asbestos or silica
claim."'
III.
A.

CASE LAW

Causes of Action

1. Negligent Failure to Warn. As a matter of first impression, the
Georgia Court of Appeals held in Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. 4 that a
plaintiff need not establish bodily harm to maintain a claim for negligent
failure to warn. 5 The plaintiff in Johnson filed suit after her house
burned down due to a defective component in her neighbor's Lincoln
Town Car. The plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages for,
inter alia, the defendants' negligent post-sale failure to warn about the
dangers of the vehicle and its component parts. Because the plaintiff
suffered no bodily injury, the trial court granted Ford's motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiff's negligent failure to warn claim.' 6
Relying on the Restatement Second of Torts,' 7 the court of appeals
vacated the trial court's grant of summary judgment and held:
"[Blodily harm" is not required to maintain a claim for negligent failure
to warn as set out in Section 388 of the Restatement Second of Torts.
Further, ... "[a] negligent failure to warn claim may arise from a
manufacturer's post-sale knowledge acquired months, 8years, or even
decades after the date of the first sale of the product."

Because the plaintiff's punitive damages claim was also based on her
claim for negligent failure to warn, the court also vacated the denial of
punitive damages and remanded the case to the trial court. 9
2. RICO Actions. The Georgia Supreme Court in Williams General
Corp. v. Stone2" granted certiorari to address "whether a corporation is

12. O.C.G.A. §§ 51-14-1 to -13 (Supp. 2007).
13. See id. § 51-14-4.
14. 281 Ga. App. 166, 637 S.E.2d 202 (2006).
15. Id. at 173, 637 S.E.2d at 207.
16. Id. at 171-72, 637 S.E.2d at 206.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
18. Johnson, 281 Ga. App. at 173, 637 S.E.2d at 207 (quoting Hunter v. Werner Co.,
258 Ga. App. 379, 383, 574 S.E.2d 426, 431 (2002)).
19. Id.
20. 280 Ga. 631, 632 S.E.2d 376 (2006).
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considered a 'person' under the Georgia civil [Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations ("RICO")] Act... and can thus be held directly
liable for conspiring with its officers" to commit a crime or fraud under
the RICO Act.2 ' Initially, the court noted that the definitions section
of the RICO Act does not expressly define "person."22 Consequently,
the court looked to other definitions of person in the O.C.G.A. which do
define person to include a corporation.2 3 The court therefore held that
"a corporation is a 'person' for purposes of the Georgia civil RICO
Act."24 After the court's holding in Williams General, it is clear there
is a cause of action against a corporation for a violation of the Georgia
RICO Act.25
B.

Litigating InsuranceIssues
The Georgia Court of Appeals issued the most important insurance
decision of 2006 in Abrohams v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Agency.2 6
In Abrohams the court clarified that O.C.G.A. section 33-7-1127 requires
uninsured motorist CUM") coverage for umbrella policies providing
automobile coverage as long as the insured has not specifically28rejected
UM coverage when obtaining or renewing the umbrella policy.

The court of appeals conceded that the text of O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11
does not address umbrella or excess liability policies.2" Because the
express terms of the statute provide no guidance, the court of appeals
observed that nothing in the Georgia Insurance Code 0 distinguishes
between primary and excess coverage policies.3 ' The court concluded
that "[h]ad the legislature intended to limit the application of [O.C.G.A.
section]
33-7-11 to primary policies only . . . it could easily have done
2
3

so."

After further examining the public policy considerations of the Georgia
UM statute and determining them to be commensurate with its holding,
the court of appeals addressed two additional issues.3 3 First, the court

21. Id. at 631, 632 S.E.2d at 377; O.C.G.A. §§ 16-14-1 to -10 (2007).
22. Williams Gen. Corp., 280 Ga. at 631, 632 S.E.2d at 377 (citing O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3).
23. Id. at 631-32, 632 S.E.2d at 377-78.
24. Id. at 631, 632 S.E.2d at 377.
25. See id.
26. 282 Ga. App. 176, 638 S.E.2d 330 (2006).
27. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (Supp. 2007).
28. Abrohams, 282 Ga. App. at 180, 638 S.E.2d at 333.
29. Id. at 179, 638 S.E.2d at 332.
30. O.C.G.A. §§ 33-1-1 to 33-61-2 (2000, 2005 & Supp. 2007).
31. Abrohams, 282 Ga. App. at 179, 638 S.E.2d at 332.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 180, 638 S.E.2d at 333.
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considered whether the statute applied to the plaintiffs' policy, which
was merely a renewal of a policy that existed prior to the July 1, 2001
amendment to O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11.14 Because the plaintiffs "had
never been offered nor had they declined UM coverage as part of their
umbrella policy," the court held that O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11 applied,
and therefore, the plaintiffs had UM coverage under their umbrella
policy. 35 Second, the court of appeals addressed whether language in
the plaintiffs' umbrella policy was void because it specifically excluded
UM coverage and thereby contradicted section 33-7-11." 6 The court
held the exclusionary language void because O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11
"requires that insurers provide UM coverage in umbrella and excess
that provide automobile and motor vehicle liability insurpolicies
37
ance."
Subsequent to Abrohams, in Soufi v. Haygood,3 8 the Georgia Court
of Appeals addressed the separate issue of whether an insured was
entitled to $300,000 in UM coverage (the amount of liability coverage)
when the insured did not specifically refuse $300,000 in UM coverage
after the 2001 amendment to O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11, but had
specifically denied such UM coverage prior to the amendment.3 9 Prior
to the 2001 amendment, the plaintiff in Soufi purchased a $300,000
automobile insurance liability policy but specifically elected to obtain
only $100,000 in UM coverage. After the 2001 amendment, the insured
added an additional automobile to the insurance policy and was later
struck by an uninsured motorist in an automobile accident.4 ° The court
of appeals held that the insured was entitled to only $100,000 in UM
coverage because the insurance coverage for the automobile purchased
after the 2001 amendment was intended to be part of the original pre2001 policy.4 ' Because the new automobile was simply added to the
existing automobile coverage, the court held the insurer was "not
required to notify the [insured] of the change in the law or to secure a
at the time the [insured] added the [new automoseparate UM election
42
bile] to [the] policy."
After Abrohams and Soufi, it appears that an insured will be entitled
to the full amount of UM coverage authorized under either the insured's

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 180-81, 638 S.E.2d at 333-34.
Id. at 181, 638 S.E.2d at 334.
Id. at 181-82, 638 S.E.2d at 334.
Id. at 182, 638 S.E.2d at 334.
282 Ga. App. 593, 639 S.E.2d 395 (2006).
Id. at 594-96, 639 S.E.2d at 397-98.
Id. at 593-94, 639 S.E.2d at 396-97.
Id. at 593, 596, 639 S.E.2d at 396, 398.
Id. at 596-97, 639 S.E.2d at 398-99.
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umbrella or liability policy regardless of whether that policy was
originally entered into prior to the 2001 amendment if the insured has
not specifically rejected UM coverage in the amount equal to the liability
or umbrella coverage.43
In Hulsey v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of America," Judge Batten of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
addressed whether an insurance company could be held liable for an
excess judgment after the insurance company failed to tender its
insured's policy limits in response to the plaintiff's time-limited
settlement demand, or "Holt demand."45 In Hulsey the plaintiff was
rendered a quadriplegic when a permissive driver wrecked the insured's
vehicle. The plaintiff in the underlying action demanded that the
insured tender her policy limits of $250,000. The insurance company
refused on the basis that it was still investigating whether the driver
was covered under the insured's insurance policy. The case was
ultimately tried, and the plaintiff was awarded $2,192,250 in damages.
The insurance company tendered its policy limits after the judgment,
and the defendant
assigned his bad faith claim against the insurance
46
company.
The defendant in the underlying action then sued the insurance
company. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the issue of
whether the insurance company acted in bad faith by failing to settle the
dispute within its insured's policy limits in response to a valid Holt
demand. The insurance company contended that it could not be liable
for bad faith because, at the time it refused to tender its policy limits in
response to the Holt demand, it was still4 considering
whether the driver
7
was covered under the insurance policy.
Judge Batten rejected the insurance company's argument and held
that a genuine issue existed whether the insurance company "either
knew or through the exercise of ordinary care should have known that
[the defendant in the underlying case] was a permissive driver prior to
the expiration of [the plaintiff's] time-limited settlement demand."4"
Judge Batten specifically noted that an insurance company has a duty
to equally consider the interests of the insured and ruled that a

43.
S.E.2d
44.
45.
(1992).
46.
47.
48.

See Abrohams, 282 Ga. App. 176, 638 S.E.2d 330; Soufi, 282 Ga. App. 593, 639
395.
460 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
Id. at 1334; see S. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267,268-69, 416 S.E.2d 274, 276-77
Hulsey, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1333.
Id. at 1333-35.
Id. at 1335.
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reasonable jury could find, under the circumstances, that the insurance
company did not so consider the "[defendant's] interests by failing to
settle [the underlying case] within the policy limits."49
C. Service of Process, Statutes of Repose, and Amendment of
Pleadings
1. Service of Process. In B&B Quick Lube, Inc. v. G&K Services
Co.," the Georgia Court of Appeals considered the level of "reasonable
diligence" necessary to attempt service of process on a corporation via its
registered agent. 1 Although service of process on a corporation is
usually perfected by serving the corporation's registered agent, "[i]f...
the agent cannot with reasonable diligence be served, the corporation
may be served by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight
delivery, return receipt requested, addressed to the secretary of the
corporation at its principal office."5 2 In determining the meaning of
reasonable diligence in the statute, the court of appeals turned to cases
involving service of process outside of the statute of limitation period, in
which a "plaintiff must establish that service was made in a reasonable
and diligent manner."53 In those cases, reasonable and diligent service
could be completed if a plaintiff provided "the sheriff's office with the
proper address of the defendant on the date the complaint was timely
filed." 4 Because the plaintiff in this case demonstrated that it had
provided the sheriff's office with the defendant's correct address, the
court held the plaintiff's attempted service was reasonably diligent, and
the plaintiff was entitled to perfect service under O.C.G.A. section 14-2504(b).55
The Georgia Court of Appeals also reaffirmed the importance of
exercising the "greatest possible diligence" to promptly serve a defendant
where the complaint is timely filed but not served until after the statute
of limitation has expired.5 6 In Kelley v. Lymon,57 the court upheld a
trial court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint when service

49. Id.
50. 283 Ga. App. 299, 641 S.E.2d 198 (2007).
51. Id. at 300, 641 S.E.2d at 200.
52. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-504(a)-(b) (2003).
53. B&B Quick Lube, Inc., 283 Ga. App. at 301, 641 S.E.2d at 200.
54. Id. (citing Lee v. Kim, 275 Ga. App. 891, 893, 622 S.E.2d 99, 101 (2005); Jackson
v. Nguyen, 225 Ga. App. 599, 600, 484 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1997); Bennett v. Matt Gay
Chevrolet Oldsmobile, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 348, 350, 408 S.E.2d 111, 113-14 (1991)).
55. Id.
56. Kelley v. Lymon, 279 Ga. App. 849, 850, 632 S.E.2d 734, 735 (2006).
57. 279 Ga. App. 849, 632 S.E.2d 734 (2006).
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had not been perfected fifteen months after the statute of limitation had
expired.5" At first glance, this is certainly not a surprising outcome.
However, the record established that the plaintiff (1) "hired a private
investigator/skip tracer to locate [the defendant]," (2) had tried to depose
the defendant, and (3) moved to compel responses to discovery and
attendance at a deposition that would have allowed her to find and serve
the defendant.5 9 According to the court, the plaintiff's critical error was
that after the private investigator failed to find the defendant, the
plaintiff "did little to attempt" to find the defendant and instead "sought
to have the trial court compel [the defendant's] deposition" and to force
the defendant to come to her."° The court considered this an "attempt
6 1
to shift the burden of [the plaintiff's] search onto the trial court."
Such an attempt could in "no way" constitute even reasonable
diligence,
62
much less the required "'greatest possible diligence.'
2. Statutes of Repose. There is no general common law exception
to statutes of repose for failure-to-warn claims. 3 Thus, in Taylor v. S
& W Development, Inc.,64 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that it
could not "'engraft"' an "'exception[]'" onto the eight-year statute of
repose for deficient construction of an improvement to real property.65
In reaching its decision, the court noted the legislature's inclusion of an
exception to the product liability statute of repose for failure-to-warn
claims and the absence of such an exception to the improvements to real
property statute.66
Ultimately, the court concluded that had the
legislature intended to exclude a warnings claim from the operation of
the improvements to real property repose statute, the legislature would
have done so.6
3. Amendment of Pleadings. In Shuler v. Hicks, Massey &
Gardner,LLP,68 the Georgia Court of Appeals considered the propriety
of amending a complaint after a plaintiff has failed to comply with the

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
(citing
64.
65.
313).
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 849, 632 S.E.2d at 735.
Id. at 850, 632 S.E.2d at 735.
Id. at 850-51, 632 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. at 851, 632 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Marr, 246 Ga. App. 445, 447, 540 S.E.2d 652, 654 (2000)).
See Taylor v. S & W Dev., Inc., 279 Ga. App. 744, 745, 632 S.E.2d 700, 702 (2006)
Harrison v. Holseneck, 208 Ga. 410, 412, 67 S.E.2d 311, 313 (1951)).
279 Ga. App. 744, 632 S.E.2d 700 (2006).
Id. at 745, 632 S.E.2d at 701-02 (quoting Harrison, 208 Ga. at 412, 67 S.E.2d at
Id. at 745-46, 632 S.E.2d at 702.
Id.
280 Ga. App. 738, 634 S.E.2d 786 (2006).
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case, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, reasoning
both that the plaintiff's failure to comply with the affidavit requirements
rendered the complaint a nullity and that the amended complaint had
been filed outside of the statute of limitations. ° The court of appeals
reversed, holding that "the failure to file an expert affidavit within the
time confines set forth in [O.C.G.A. section] 9-11-9.1 does not result in
an automatic adjudication on the merits or preclude a plaintiff from
amending the complaint after the expiration of the relevant statute of
limitation."71 Thus, the plaintiff's failure to file an expert affidavit only
rendered the case subject to dismissal, not automatically void.7 2 The
plaintiff was therefore entitled to amend his complaint at any time.73
D.

Venue

In EHCA Cartersville,LLC v.Turner,74 the Georgia Supreme Court

considered the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. section 9-10-31(c),75 which
changed the rules regarding transfer of medical malpractice cases as
part of the Tort Reform Act of 2005.76 According to O.C.G.A. section 910-31(c), in a medical malpractice action, "a nonresident defendant may
require that the case be transferred to the county of that defendant's
residence if the tortious act upon which the medical malpractice claim
is based occurred in the county of that defendant's residence." 77 The
supreme court addressed whether O.C.G.A. section 9-10-31(c) violated
the joint tortfeasor venue provision of the Georgia Constitution, which
provides that an action may be tried in the county of residence of either
tortfeasor.79
The supreme court held that O.C.G.A. section 9-10-31(c) was indeed
unconstitutional. 0 In so holding, the court observed that although the

69. Id. at 738, 634 S.E.2d at 787 (discussing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (2006), amended by
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (Supp. 2007)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 739-40, 634 S.E.2d at 788 (citing Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 332-33,
519 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1999)).
72. Id. at 740, 634 S.E.2d at 788.
73. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(a) (2006).
74. 280 Ga. 333, 626 S.E.2d 482 (2006).
75. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31(c) (2007).
76. EHCA Cartersville,LLC, 280 Ga. at 333, 626 S.E.2d at 483; see 2005 Ga. Laws 1,
1-2.
77. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31(c).
78. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 4.
79. EHCA Cartersville,LLC, 280 Ga. at 334-35, 626 S.E.2d at 485.
80. Id.
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Georgia Constitution authorizes the Georgia General Assembly to enact
laws that permit Georgia superior courts to exercise the power to change
venue, 81 O.C.G.A. section 9-10-31(c) vests the power to change venue
in nonresident defendants, not the trial court.82
The supreme court also considered whether O.C.G.A. section 9-1031.1(a), 3 the forum non conveniens statute, was constitutional. 4 In
holding the statute constitutional, the court noted that the statute
vested the ability to transfer cases in the courts themselves.8 " Further,
the court held
that the forum non conveniens statute could be applied
86
retroactively.
E. Verification and Affidavit PleadingRequirements
In Allen v. Wright,87 the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.2, s ' which required a medical malpractice plaintiff to

make certain medical disclosures to the opposing party,8 9 was preempted by the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("HIPAA") of 1996,"0 which protects a patient's medical information.91
In so holding, the supreme court relied heavily on the court of appeals
holding in Northlake Medical Center, LLC v. Queen 92 that O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.2 and HIPAA could not coexist.9 3 Specifically, the court
noted that HIPAA requires any medical authorization to include certain
elements, including express notice to the patient of the right to revoke
the authorization.94 By comparison, the court noted that O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.2 does not require the medical authorization form to
contain such a notification provision.95 Unable to reconcile O.C.G.A.

81. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 7.
82. EHCA Cartersville,LLC, 280 Ga. at 335-36, 626 S.E.2d at 485-86.
83. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31.1(a) (2007).
84. EHCA Cartersville,LLC, 280 Ga. at 337, 626 S.E.2d at 486.
85. Id.
86. Id., 626 S.E.2d at 487.
87. 282 Ga. 9, 644 S.E.2d 814 (2007).
88. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.2 (2006).
89. Id.
90. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
91. Allen, 282 Ga. at 12, 644 S.E.2d at 816-17.
92. 280 Ga. App. 510, 634 S.E.2d 486 (2006).
93. Allen, 282 Ga. at 12-13, 644 S.E.2d 816-17 (citing Northlake Med. Ctr., 280 Ga. App.
at 515, 634 S.E.2d at 491); see also Griffin v. Burden, 281 Ga. App. 496, 636 S.E.2d 686
(2006); Crisp Reg'l Hosp., Inc. v. Sanders, 281 Ga. App. 393, 636 S.E.2d 123 (2006).
94. Allen, 282 Ga. at 11, 644 S.E.2d at 816.
95. Specifically, O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2(b) requires the following:
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section 9-11-9.2 with HIPAA's requirements, the court held that HIPAA
preempted the Georgia statute.9 6
Justice Hunstein concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that
although O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2(c) should be preempted, the
remaining portions of section 9-11-9.2 could coexist with the HIPAA
requirements. 7 Essentially, Justice Hunstein's dissent amounted to a
disagreement with the majority over statutory construction principles.98
Applying the precept that "'a court [is] to construe a statute as valid
when possible,"' Justice Hunstein concluded that an authorization form
could be drafted that would satisfy both the Georgia statute and HIPAA
because O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2 did not expressly prohibit an
authorization form from including an express release provision.99
The majority, however, applied the principle of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius to conclude the General Assembly intended to exclude
any other content from the authorization form because section 9-11-9.2

expressly requires the authorization form to include certain specific
content. 1'° While the majority and Justice Hunstein both noted the
validity of each competing tenet of statutory construction, they disagreed
about which tenet should be given priority.
Various cases during this survey period also considered the expert
affidavit requirements set forth in the revised O.C.G.A. section 9-119.1.1°" In Howell v. Shumans, °2 the Georgia Court of Appeals held
that section 9-11-9.1 did not require an expert affidavit when the
complaint alleged invasion of privacy by a nurse who disclosed private

The authorization shall provide that the attorney representing the defendant is
authorized to obtain and disclose protected health information contained in
medical records to facilitate the investigation, evaluation, and defense of the
claims and allegations set forth in the complaint which pertain to the plaintiff or,
where applicable, the plaintiffs decedent whose treatment is at issue in the
complaint. This authorization includes the defendant's attorney's right to discuss
the care and treatment of the plaintiff or, where applicable, the plaintiffs decedent
with all of the plaintiffs or decedent's treating physicians.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.2(b).
96. Allen, 282 Ga. at 12, 644 S.E.2d at 816.
97. Id. at 15, 644 S.E.2d at 818 (Hunstein, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). According to O.C.G.A. section 9.2(c), a plaintiff must authorize the release of all
health information, not just information relevant to the plaintiffs action. O.C.G.A. § 9-119.2(c).
98. Allen, 282 Ga. at 14-20, 644 S.E.2d at 818-21 (Hunstein, P.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
99. Id. at 16, 644 S.E.2d at 819 (quoting Banks v. Ga. Power Co., 267 Ga. 602, 603,
481 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1997)).
100. Id. at 14, 644 S.E.2d at 817 (majority opinion).
101. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (Supp. 2007).
102. 281 Ga. App. 459, 636 S.E.2d 182 (2006).
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medical information." 3 Similarly, in Shuler v. Hicks, Massey &
Gardner,LLP,'0 4 the court of appeals held that a plaintiff need not
present an expert affidavit in a fraud case, even if the fraud claim
alleged the same pertinent facts as a professional malpractice claim. 10
In this case, the plaintiff filed a professional malpractice claim but did
not contemporaneously file an expert affidavit. The defendant moved to
dismiss, but the plaintiff subsequently amended the complaint to omit
the malpractice claim and add a claim for fraud.0 6
The courts in both Howell' and Shuler 0 8 relied on the supreme
court's decision in Labovitz v. Hopkinson,"°9 which was decided before
the recent amendments to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 and held that
"claims grounded on a professional's intentional acts which allegedly
resulted in injury ...are not required to be accompanied by an expert
affidavit."" 0 The court in Shuler reasoned that the recent amendment
did not alter the applicability of the rule in Labovitz because the General
Assembly declined to modify the language upon which the court in
Labovitz relied."'
Lastly, in Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Gilbert,"2 the Georgia Court of
Appeals clarified that an expert affidavit suffices under O.C.G.A.
sections 9_11_9.1113 and 24-9-67.1"' if the affiant was licensed at the
time of the alleged act or omission, regardless of whether the affiant is
licensed at the time he or she signs the expert affidavit." 5
F

Evidence and Expert Testimony
In Snider v. Basilio,"6 the supreme court considered the following
question: "[Under] what circumstances, if any, is evidence of a nurse's
failure to pass a licensing examination admissible in a medical
malpractice action against the employing physician?""' 7 The plaintiffs

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 459-60, 636 S.E.2d at 182-83.
280 Ga. App. 738, 634 S.E.2d 786 (2006).
Id. at 741, 634 S.E.2d at 789.
Id. at 738, 634 S.E.2d at 787.
281 Ga. App. at 459-60, 636 S.E.2d at 183.
280 Ga. App. at 739-40, 634 S.E.2d at 788.
271 Ga. 330, 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999).
Id. at 336, 519 S.E.2d at 678.
Shuler, 280 Ga. App. at 741, 634 S.E.2d at 789.
277 Ga. App. 895, 627 S.E.2d 821 (2006).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (2006), amended by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (Supp. 2007).
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (Supp. 2007).
Gilbert, 277 Ga. App. at 900-01, 627 S.E.2d at 827.
281 Ga. 261, 637 S.E.2d 40 (2006).
Id. at 261, 637 S.E.2d at 41.
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sued their child's pediatrician for allowing the on-call nurse, who was
unlicensed and had failed the nursing licensing examination three times,
to give unsupervised and incorrect medical advice that resulted in their
child's misdiagnosis and injuries.11 The court clarified that the very
fact that the nurse "was unlicensed[, not why she was unlicensed,] was
key to resolving [the] issue" at trial.1 9 Consequently, the court of
appeals and the supreme court both affirmed the trial court's ruling in
this case, which was to admit evidence showing the nurse was unlicensed but to strike any evidence showing the nurse's previous failures
to pass the licensing examination. 20
In a line of cases beginning with Cotten v. Phillips,2 ' the court of
appeals clarified that O.C.G.A. section 24-9-67.1(c) does not require
expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases to practice in the same
specialty as the doctor against whom they are testifying. 22 Later, in
Abramson v. Williams,'2' the court of appeals noted that the Georgia
General Assembly considered and rejected a modification to O.C.G.A.
24
section 24-9-67.1 that would have contained such a requirement.
The court of appeals also discussed its holding in Cotten, which was
adopted from the trial court's holding in that case:
"It appears that the legislature has allowed for an overlap in specialties, whereby an otherwise qualified medical doctor belonging to
Specialty A can render an opinion about the acts or omissions of
another medical doctor belonging to Specialty B-so long as the opinion
of the
expert witness belonging to Specialty A pertains to Specialty
25
A.",1

The court of appeals also determined in Canas v. Al-Jabi'126 that

even in a medical malpractice action, an expert should be assessed
according to O.C.G.A. subsection 24-9-67.1(b), not subsection (c), when

118.
119.

Id. at 261-62, 637 S.E.2d at 41.
Id. at 263, 637 S.E.2d at 42.

120. Id. at 263-64, 637 S.E.2d at 42.
121.

280 Ga. App. 280, 633 S.E.2d 655 (2006).

122. Id. at 283, 633 S.E.2d at 657-58; see also MCG Health, Inc. v. Barton, 285 Ga.
App. 577, 580, 647 S.E.2d 81, 85 (2007); Mays v. Ellis, 283 Ga. App. 195, 197-98, 641

S.E.2d 201, 203 (2007); Canas v. Al-Jabi, 282 Ga. App. 764, 795, 639 S.E.2d 494, 521
(2006); Abramson v. Williams, 281 Ga. App. 617, 618-19, 636 S.E.2d 765, 766-67 (2006).
123. 281 Ga. App. 617, 636 S.E.2d 765 (2006).

124. Id. at 619, 636 S.E.2d at 767.
125. Id. at 618-19, 636 S.E.2d at 767 (quoting Cotten, 280 Ga. App. at 283, 633 S.E.2d
at 657).
126. 282 Ga. 764, 639 S.E.2d 494 (2006).
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the expert's testimony relates to issues other than medical malpractice.127
G. Mootness and Notice Issues
In McGowan v. Progressive Preferred Insurance Co.,12s the Georgia
Supreme Court held that an appraisal clause in an automobile insurance
contract could not moot or negate a plaintiff's claim that the insurer had
conspired to intentionally undervalue her vehicle damage claim. 129 In
this case, the plaintiff alleged breach of contract, fraud, and Georgia
RICO claims against her insurer and a company it used to provide
"total-loss valuations" in connection with vehicle property damage
claims. 3 ° The trial court ordered an appraisal pursuant to a term of
the insurance contract. The appraisal resulted in a higher valuation
than the initial amount determined by the insurer and its appraiser.
13
The insurer then paid the higher amount and moved to dismiss. '
The trial court granted the motion, finding that the issues raised by the
plaintiff's claims were "rendered moot in light of the appraisal process
and the resulting higher payment" for the plaintiff's vehicle. 3 2 The
court of appeals affirmed. 3
In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court recognized that
an "appraisal clause" does not address "broader issues such as an
insurer's potential liability to an insured for claims made in a lawsuit." 34 Thus, the court held that an appraisal clause could not moot

the plaintiff's fraud, breach of contract, and RICO claims.' 3' According
to the court, to hold otherwise "would be tantamount to converting the
is impermissible in
appraisal clause into an arbitration clause," which
36
a contract between an insurer and an insured.
In addition to the mootness issues above, a handful of issues regarding
notice requirements have recently been determined by Georgia
In Perdue v. Athens Technical College,'3 ' the Georgia
courts. 3 7

127. Id. at 794, 639 S.E.2d at 521.
128. 281 Ga. 169, 637 S.E.2d 27 (2006).
129. Id. at 172, 637 S.E.2d at 29.
130. Id. at 169-70, 637 S.E.2d at 27-28.
131. Id. at 170, 637 S.E.2d at 27-28.
132. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 28.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 171, 637 S.E.2d at 28.
135. Id. at 171-72, 637 S.E.2d at 29.
136. Id. at 172-73, 637 S.E.2d at 29.
137. See Atlanta Taxicab Co. Owners Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 342, 638 S.E.2d
307 (2006); Perdue v. Athens Technical Coll., 283 Ga. App. 404, 641 S.E.2d 631 (2007);
J.M.I.C. Life Ins. Co. v. Toole, 280 Ga. App. 372, 634 S.E.2d 123 (2006).
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Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a complaint based on the
Georgia Tort Claims Act 139 because the plaintiff's ante litem notice "did
not state '[t]he amount of the loss claimed,' as required by [O.C.G.A.
The court was unpersuaded by the
section] 50-21-26(a)(5)(E)." 14'
plaintiff's argument that it was "not practicable ... to quantify her
monetary demand" because she was seeking noneconomic damages,
which can only be measured by "the enlightened conscience of the
jury., 141 Ultimately, the court held that a plaintiff must adhere to the
ante litem notice requirements, including stating an amount of loss

claimed. 142

In Atlanta Taxicab Co. Owners Ass'n v. City of Atlanta,43 however,
the Georgia Supreme Court recognized that a plaintiff who fails to give
sufficient ante litem notice may cure the problem by dismissing its claim,
giving the required pre-litigation notice, and then later amending its
complaint to add the claim back. 1 "
In J.M.LC. Life Insurance Co. v. Toole,"' the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that the notice requirement in O.C.G.A. section 33-31_9146
does not require an insured to give his or her insurer "pre-suit notice" of
an early loan payoff. 147 Instead, the court held that filing suit against
the insurer for a refund of an unearned148 premium provides sufficient
notice to the insurer under Georgia law.
H.

Arbitration

In Crawford v. Great American Cash Advance, Inc.,149 the Georgia
Court of Appeals considered, inter alia, whether an arbitration provision
in a payday loan contract could be enforced when the plaintiff contended
that the underlying contract itself was void ab initio. 50 The court
affirmed the trial court's order compelling arbitration and held that the
arbitrator, not the trial court, must determine whether the contract

138.
139.
140.
141.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

283 Ga. App. 404, 641 S.E.2d 631 (2007).
O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 to -37 (2006).
283 Ga. App. at 408, 641 S.E.2d at 634 (citing O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5)(E)).
Id.
Id.
281 Ga. 342, 638 S.E.2d 307 (2006).
Id. at 351, 638 S.E.2d at 316.
280 Ga. App. 372, 634 S.E.2d 123 (2006).
O.C.G.A. § 33-31-9 (2005).
280 Ga. App. at 374, 634 S.E.2d at 126-27.
Id. at 374-75, 634 S.E.2d at 127.
284 Ga. App. 690, 644 S.E.2d 522 (2007).
Id. at 692, 644 S.E.2d at 525.
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Thus, the court
containing the arbitration provision is in fact void.'
in Crawford clarified that the trial court must only determine whether
the arbitration provision in the contract is valid. 15 2 The court further
noted that if the arbitration provision is deemed valid, the arbitrator is
contract in which the
tasked with determining whether the entire
153
arbitration provision is contained is valid.
In Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. I,"' the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
decided, as a matter of first impression, that "absent a showing that the
parties specifically agreed to retroactively rescind or terminate the
arbitration agreement itself, an arbitration agreement generally survives
novation and remains enforceable against an original party."' 55 Thus,
the court in Goshawk made it clear that parties are bound by earlier
arbitration agreements even if there has subsequently been a novation
56
of the contract in which the arbitration provision is contained.
I.

Res Judicata

In Bryan County v. Yates Paving & Grading Co., 157 the Georgia
Supreme Court recognized that an arbitration agreement does not
preclude a trial court's decision pertaining to "a principle of law that
does not arise out of the contract documents." 55 In this case, the court
specifically held that the question of whether res judicata barred the
arbitration proceeding was an issue
plaintiffs' claims based on an earlier
59
for the court, not an arbitrator.1
In BKJB Partnership v. Moseman,' the Georgia Court of Appeals
decided an issue concerning choice of law in the context of claim
Specifically, the court held that Georgia courts,
preclusion analysis.'
in determining the preclusive effect of a federal trial court judgment in
a state law diversity case, should look to "'the law that would be applied
courts in the State in which the first federal diversity court
by state
62
sits.'"1

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 695, 644 S.E.2d at 526.
Id. at 692-93, 644 S.E.2d at 525.
Id. at 692, 644 S.E.2d at 524.
466 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
Id. at 1299.
Id.
281 Ga. 361, 638 S.E.2d 302 (2006).
Id. at 363, 638 S.E.2d at 304.
Id. at 364, 638 S.E.2d at 304-05.
284 Ga. App. 862, 644 S.E.2d 874 (2007).
Id. at 865, 644 S.E.2d at 876.
Id. (quoting Q Int'l Courier v. Smoak, 441 F.3d 214, 218 (4th Cir. 2006)).
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Sovereign Immunity

In Georgia Forestry Commission v. Canady,63 the Georgia Supreme
Court clarified the scope of the provision in the Georgia Tort Claims Act
which ensures that the state is not liable for "'the method of providing
The supreme court held
law enforcement, police, or fire protection.""'
that the term "method" had been previously interpreted by the appellate
courts so broadly that it "effectively negate[d], insofar as law enforcement, police, and fire protection personnel [were] concerned, the waiver
of sovereign immunity" under the Georgia Tort Claims Act.'6 5 That
line of cases was therefore abrogated, and sovereign immunity is now
provided for "the making of policy decisions by state employees and
officers ... and ... the acts and omissions of state employees and
officers executing and implementing those policies." 166
K.

Summary Judgment, Default Judgment, and Voluntary Dismissal

1.
Summary Judgment. In All Tech Co. v. Laimer Unicon,
LLC,'6 7 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's sua
sponte grant of summary judgment based on the statute of limitations.16 In this case, the defendant raised the statute of limitations
in its answer, and also made reference to its statute of limitations
defense in a responsive brief opposing the plaintiff's summary judgment
motion.1" 9 Following the trial court's decision to enter summary
judgment against the plaintiff, the court of appeals held that the
plaintiff had sufficient notice of the basis of the court's ruling based on
the defendant's answer and the argument in the defendant's responsive
brief.170
In Brookview Holdings v. Saurez,'17 1 a premises liability case based
on a failure to provide security, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed

163. 280 Ga. 825, 632 S.E.2d 105 (2006).
164. Id. at 826, 632 S.E.2d at 107 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6)).
165. Id. at 827, 632 S.E.2d at 108.
166. Id. at 830, 632 S.E.2d at 110. The cases abrogated by Georgia Forestry
Commission were as follows: Hilson v. Departmentof Public Safety, 236 Ga. App. 638, 512
S.E.2d 910 (1999); Price v. State, 250 Ga. App. 872, 553 S.E.2d 194 (2001); Blackston v.
Georgia Departmentof Public Safety, 274 Ga. App. 373, 618 S.E.2d 78 (2005); and Lona v.
Hall County, 219 Ga. App. 853, 467 S.E.2d 186 (1996).
167. 281 Ga. App. 579, 636 S.E.2d 753 (2006).
168. Id. at 581, 636 S.E.2d at 755-56.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 581-82, 636 S.E.2d at 756.
171. 285 Ga. App. 90, 645 S.E.2d 559 (2007).

440

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

the denial of a summary judgment motion based solely on opinion
evidence pertaining to proximate cause, noting that a plaintiff's
proof "is
17 2
to be treated with indulgence" on summary judgment.
2. Default Judgment. In Bannister v. Honeywell International,
Inc.,"' the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia considered the curious instance of a defendant, while in
17 4
automatic default in state court, removing a case to federal court.
In this case, two defendants were in automatic default in state court.
Subsequently, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all other defendants,
creating complete diversity between the plaintiff and the remaining
defendants. The defendants timely removed the case to federal court
and filed answers. The plaintiff moved for a default judgment in that
court, arguing that the defendants were already in default when the case
arrived in federal court.7 5 Relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
81(c), 176 which provides the procedure for a defendant to answer a
removed case, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a),' 77 which
provides for entry of default only where the party does not answer a
complaint, the court concluded default was unwarranted. 17
Thus,
plaintiffs should be cautious when handling a case in which a foreign
defendant is in default in state court and not dismiss parties that would
create complete diversity
and thus allow a defendant a second chance to
79
answer the complaint.
3. Voluntary Dismissal. Amended O.C.G.A. section 9-11-41(a)(3) 0 which became effective July 1, 2003, s currently provides that
the voluntary dismissal of a second complaint, not a third, operates as
an adjudication on the merits.8 2 In Davis v. Lugenbeel,8 3 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that this amended provision could not be used

172. Id. at 96, 645 S.E.2d at 566.
173. No. 1:06-cv-1772-WSD, 2006 WL 3709524 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 14, 2006).
174. Id. at *1.
175. Id.
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c).
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
178. Bannister, 2006 WL 3709524, at *2.
179. A plaintiff need not worry if the case has been filed for more than one year. See
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000).
180. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a)(3) (2006).
181. See 2003 Ga. Laws 820, 828.
182. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a)(3).
183. 283 Ga. App. 642, 642 S.E.2d 337 (2007).
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retroactively to dismiss a case that was originally filed before the
amended statute's effective date." 4
L.

Sanctions

8 5
In Fowler v. Atlanta Napp Deady, Inc.,"
the Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's order striking the defendants' answer
and counterclaims as a sanction for discovery abuse." 6 The defendants answered the plaintiffs' initial discovery request by promising to
produce responsive documents at some unspecified time in the future.
After being contacted numerous times by the plaintiffs' counsel, the
defendants produced incomplete discovery responses over two months
after they were originally due. Three months after the defendants
produced incomplete discovery responses, the plaintiffs moved to compel
full and complete discovery responses. The trial court granted the
motion on November 17, 2005, ordering the defendants to respond in full
by December 7, 2005. The defendants produced additional documents
prior to December 7, 2005, but at a deposition on December 13, 2005, a
representative admitted that the defendants had not produced numerous
categories of information despite the plaintiffs' request and the court's
order for their production. Upon hearing that the defendants had still
not fully complied with their discovery obligations, the plaintiffs moved
for sanctions, and the trial court granted that motion on February 21,

2006.187

Four days before the court's hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for
sanctions and ten days before the case was scheduled to be tried, the
defendants produced additional documents and asked the court to
disregard their previous refusal to comply with the court's orders due to
health concerns. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for
sanctions and dismissed the defendants' answer.'
The defendants
appealed
and
contended
that
their
failure
to
comply
was not "'wil89
ful."
The court of appeals rejected that argument and offered the following
explanation:
[T]he defendants made repeated empty promises to fully respond to the
plaintiffs' request for production of documents. They did not fully
respond, however, until after the court imposed the sanction of

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 642-43, 642 S.E.2d at 338.
283 Ga. App. 331, 641 S.E.2d 573 (2007).
Id. at 334-35, 641 S.E.2d at 576.
Id. at 333-34, 641 S.E.2d at 575-76.
Id.
Id. at 334, 641 S.E.2d at 576.
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dismissal, and long after the deadline in the order compelling discovery
had passed....
We find no merit in the defendants' argument that the trial court
should not have imposed the extreme sanction of dismissal because
they did not totally fail to produce documents. In State Farm [Mutual
Automobile Insurance] Co. v. Health Horizons, a whole court decision,
we rejected a similar argument, noting that "[i]f that were the law,
then a defendant could endlessly respond to a motion to compel by
partially complying while asserting various forms of privilege or
unavailability
or difficulty of production in order to 'stay in the
1 90
game.'
After Fowler it is clear that a party's empty promise to produce
documents at some unspecified time in the future will not insulate a
party from the imposition of severe sanctions, and a belated production
does not cure the earlier failure to produce after a motion for sanctions
is filed.' 9 '
M.

Damages Issues

In Smith v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, 92 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia considered the
applicability of Georgia's anti-subrogation statute 193 to a benefit
provider's attempt to seek a "set-off' of benefits.'9 4 Georgia's antisubrogation statue provides that administrators of employee benefit
plans may only seek reimbursement of medical expenses paid if the
amount of recovery exceeds the sum of all economic and noneconomic
losses incurred as a result of an injury, and any reimbursement claim
must be reduced by the pro rata amount of attorney fees and litigation
expenses incurred by the injured party.'95 In this case, the defendant
initially attempted to avoid the Georgia statute by arguing that the term
"reimbursement" in the statute did not include an offset of monthly
disability payments. 196
The district court rejected this argument,
noting that O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1(f) specifies that providers may
benefits as a means of enforcing a
not "'withhold or set off insurance
' 197
claim for reimbursement.

190.
Ins. Co.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 334-35, 641 S.E.2d at 576 (footnote omitted) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto
v. Health Horizons, Inc., 264 Ga. App. 443, 447, 590 S.E.2d 798, 801 (2003)).
See id.
466 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1 (2005).
466 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1(b).
Smith, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1287-89.
Id. at 1287-89 (emphasis added) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1(f)).
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The district court similarly rejected the defendant's claim that the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") of 197419
preempted Georgia's anti-subrogation statute.'9 9
In reaching its
decision, the district court noted that ERISA does not preempt state
statutes that relate to an employee benefit plan if that statute "'regulates insurance.'" 20 0
Applying the United States Supreme Court's
analysis in Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller,2 °' the district
court determined that Georgia's anti-subrogation statute regulated
insurance because it is directed toward the insurance industry and
substantially affects the risk pooling arrangement between an insurer
and an insured.2 °2 Therefore, the district court held that ERISA did
not preempt the Georgia statute, and the defendant was not entitled to
a set-off.2"'
N.

Jury Charges and Strikes

In Flexible Products Co. v.Ervast, °4 the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that the trial court erred because its jury charge was "contradictory
and confusing." 2 5 The court of appeals specifically noted that "[t]he
trial court's charges failed to address the relationship between [a]
general rule and [its] exception" regarding liability for corporate
directors and officers.20 6 The general rule at issue was a provision in
O.C.G.A. section 15-19-17,207 which, according to the court of appeals,
foreclosed "liability for actions based on the advice of counsel." 20 8 The
court further noted "that an exception ... for corporate directors and
officers subject to certain conditions" was codified in O.C.G.A. sections
14-2-830 and 14-2-842.209 In Ervast the trial court first charged the
jury on the relevant exception for the defendants' liability and then
charged on the general rule in a later unrelated instruction. 20 The
court of appeals held that this error warranted a new trial.2"1'

198. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
199. Smith, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1290-92.
200. Id. at 1290 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)).
201. 538 U.S. 329 (2003).
202. Smith, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
203. Id. at 1292.
204. 284 Ga. App. 178, 643 S.E.2d 560 (2007).
205. Id. at 180, 643 S.E.2d at 563.
206. Id.
207. O.C.G.A. § 15-19-17 (2005).
208. Ervast, 284 Ga. App. at 180, 643 S.E.2d at 563 (citing O.C.G.A. § 15-19-17).
209. Id.; O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-830, -842 (2003).
210. 284 Ga. App. at 179-80, 643 S.E.2d at 564.
211. Id. at 180, 643 S.E.2d at 563.
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In Pearson v. Tippmann Pneumatics, Inc.,212 the Georgia Supreme
Court warned about the necessity of adequately charging a jury on
proximate cause in actions against multiple defendants so that a jury
will understand that more than one actor can proximately cause an
injury. 13 The supreme court also reversed the court of appeals holding
that the plaintiffs had failed to preserve their objection to the trial
court's proximate cause recharge under O.C.G.A. section 5-5-24214 by
not requesting specific language in an alternate charge, even though
they had originally submitted a proposed recharge and objected to the
court's chosen language before and after the recharge was given.2 15
Lastly, in Sellers v. Burrowes,216 the Georgia Court of Appeals
determined that a trial court abused its discretion by wrongly declining
to strike a potential juror for cause in a medical malpractice case, thus
forcing the plaintiff to unnecessarily use a peremptory strike at
trial. 2 7 The juror disclosed to the trial court and counsel that she was
the niece of three doctors and the sister of another, "that she would find
in favor of the doctor absent 'clear and convincing proof[,I' . . that she
would resolve any doubts in the evidence in favor of the doctor," and that
she was not the "'best person"' to serve as a juror in that case.218
Although the trial court and defense counsel attempted to rehabilitate
the juror, the court of appeals determined that the potential juror was
still too biased to serve and noted:
"Running through the entire fabric of our Georgia decisions is a thread
which plainly indicates that the broad general principle intended to be
applied in every case is that each juror shall be so free from either
prejudice or bias as to guarantee the inviolability of an impartial trial.
If error is to be committed, let it be in favor of the absolute impartiality
and purity of the jurors."219
0.

Post-trialLitigation Issues

In Mateen v. Dicus ° the Georgia Supreme Court clarified that a
notice of appeal need not specify "every order that could possibly present

212. 281 Ga. 740, 642 S.E.2d 691 (2007).
213. Id. at 743-44, 642 S.E.2d at 694-95.
214. O.C.G.A. § 5-5-24 (1995).
215. Pearson, 281 Ga. at 742-43, 642 S.E.2d at 694; see Pearson v. Tippmann
Pneumatics, Inc., 277 Ga. App. 722, 627 S.E.2d 431 (2006), rev'd, 281 Ga. 740, 642 S.E.2d
691 (2007).
216. 283 Ga. App. 505, 642 S.E.2d 145 (2007).
217. Id. at 508, 642 S.E.2d at 148.
218. Id.
219. Id. (quoting Guoth v. Hamilton, 273 Ga. App. 435, 615 S.E.2d 239, 242 (2005)).
220. 281 Ga. 455, 637 S.E.2d 377 (2006).
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an issue on appeal." 22' Thus, the supreme court held that a notice of
appeal filed
from a final judgment preserves all issues for appellate
2
22

review.

In Rouse v. Arrington,223 the Georgia Court of Appeals explained
that when a trial court enters dismissal as a sanction, but then in a
subsequent order clarifies that the dismissal was with prejudice, the
subsequent order begins a new thirty-day period within which the
plaintiff can file a notice of appeal. 224 According to the court of
appeals, even though the trial court styled its subsequent order nunc pro
tunc (now for then), a change of the dismissal to "with prejudice" went
"to the very heart of the [plaintiff's] substantive rights" and thus
"effectively commenced a new 30-day period during which [the plaintiff]
225
could file her notice of appeal."
In Aldworth Co. v.England,226 the Georgia Supreme Court held that
a defendant who fails to challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
evidence with a directed verdict motion cannot obtain judgment as a
matter of law at the appellate level based on a sufficiency of the evidence
argument. 27 However, the court further held that a defendant can
seek a new trial based on sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, even if
he or she failed to file a directed verdict motion.
P. Attorney Fees
In EarthResources, LLC v. Morgan County,22 9 the Georgia Supreme
Court considered the applicability of Georgia's Strategic Lawsuit Against
Public Participation ("anti-SLAPP") statute230 to a county's claim for
attorney fees."' In this case, the defendant Morgan County prevailed
in the trial court on summary judgment. Morgan County also sought
and received attorney fees from the plaintiff. 232 The plaintiff appealed,
arguing that the anti-SLAPP statute precluded Morgan County's claim
for attorney fees under O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14(a).23 3 The supreme

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 456, 637 S.E.2d at 378.

Id.
283 Ga. App. 204, 641 S.E.2d 214 (2007).
Id. at 206, 641 S.E.2d at 216-17.
Id.
281 Ga. 197, 637 S.E.2d 198 (2006).
Id. at 197-98, 637 S.E.2d at 199.
Id.
281 Ga. 396, 638 S.E.2d 325 (2006).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 (2006).
EarthResources,281 Ga. at 401, 638 S.E.2d at 329.
Id. at 396-97, 638 S.E.2d at 327.
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) (2006).
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court disagreed, relying on the Georgia General Assembly's purposes
behind enacting the anti-SLAPP statute-to encourage Georgians to
exercise their constitutional rights by petitioning the government to
redress grievances. 234 The statute was not intended to allow citizens
to pursue abusive litigation while avoiding the consequences of O.C.G.A.
section 9-15-14; therefore, the award of attorney fees was proper.25
The Georgia Court of Appeals reaffirmed the evidentiary requirements
necessary to support an award of attorney fees in In re Serpentfoot.236
In this case, the trial court awarded the defendant attorney fees of $2500
on the ground that the plaintiff's conduct was "unreasonably and
stubbornly litigious and ... frivolous."237 First noting that O.C.G.A.
section 13-6-11238 generally does not allow a defendant to recover
attorney fees, the court focused on O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14(b) and its
requirement of "'express findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the
statutory basis for"' awarding attorney fees. 239 Finding no such
express support in the trial court's order, the court of appeals vacated
the award of attorney fees.24 °
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although this survey is not meant to be an exhaustive summary of all
pertinent case and statutory law for the designated period, the foregoing
presents what the authors believe to be the most significant developments in Georgia's trial practice and procedure.

234. EarthResources, 281 Ga. at 401, 628 S.E.2d at 329.
235. Id.
236. 285 Ga. App. 325, 646 S.E.2d 267 (2007).
237. Id. at 328, 646 S.E.2d at 268, 270.
238. O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (1982 & Supp. 2007). Specifically, this statute permits an
award of attorney fees where a defendant has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly
litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense. Id.
239. In re Serpentfoot, 285 Ga. App. at 329, 646 S.E.2d at 271 (quoting Hall v. Monroe
County, 271 Ga. App. 895, 897, 611 S.E.2d 120, 123 (2005)).
240. Id. The court also vacated the award because appellant had provided no
evidentiary basis to support the reasonableness of the attorney fee award. Id.

